Theoretical conditions associated with division of labour among firms are considered in relation to designers and constructors of buildings in the UK. A long-term historical view of this slow-changing industry suggests that designers' independence peaked around the middle of the twentieth century and that subsequently some of their functions began to be integrated into other firms. The waning of designers' independence occurred despite continued market growth (albeit subject to considerable fluctuations). It is proposed that independence and its decline related to aspects of the professionalization of designers. Sharp division of labour promoted by professionalization divorced designers and clients, and in this sense progressed too far. The recent developments have partly reversed this trend.
Introduction \
From any viewpoint, the role of the designer of buildings is probably onẽ of the least understood and most criticised. (A. Rougvie, 1987) i professionalization as a body has alienated them from production and from their ultimate consumers. Division of labour among building designers is selected for study for three reasons. First, construction may be regarded as one model of a project-based manufacturing industry. As product cycles in manufacturing become shorter, so leading industries move towards project-based production rather than flow-based production. Under these conditions, construction, rather than being thought of as an organizational laggard, becomes redefined as a project-based leader (Groak, 1992; Ventre, 1988) . Second, there has been dissatisfaction on the demand side with the performance of the industry. Government and major customers have long expressed misgivings and sought remedies (Emmerson, 1962; Ministry of Public Buildings & Works, 1964) . Third, the division of labour has been taken to an advanced extent in the UK as compared with many other countries (Buchanan, 1985; Rosenberg, 1972, pp. 46-7) , and is now experiencing pressure for change in the roles and responsibilities of designers and others (RIBA, 1992; Luck, 1993) .
The specific study of UK construction has general implications for both history and theory. On the side of history, the ways in which the division of labour was undertaken, and professionalization took place, are probably paralleled in other activities in the UK over this time span, such as engineering. These may well have been contributory factors to the relative industrial decline of the UK, when set against the different experience in independence versus integration in industrial rivals such as the USA. On the side of theory, the study carries the implication that a functional division of labour may sometimes become excessive, in the sense of impeding the contact and information flows required for satisfactory development.
Conditions for Independence and Integration
In beginning with the theoretical aspects of the division of labour among firms, independence is taken to mean the segmentation of the organizational process into subsystems, while conversely integration means the achievement of unity among the various subsystems (Lee and Lawrence 1985, p. 42) . As is customary in industrial economics, vertical integration is defined here as the performance of successive stages in the whole process by the same firm, and the reverse for disintegration (Needham, 1978, pp. 187, 203) ; diversification represents the extent to which a firm produces different products or services. A given firm may be considered to be more or less independent either of like firms (i.e. firms producing similar goods or services) or of unlike firms (i.e. firms producing dissimilar goods or services). This study is primarily 864 concerned with the independence of unlike firms, or (putting it the other way round) with the degrees of vertical integration of the construction industry. The experience of building designers in this context may be clarified by comparison with the experience of the nineteenth-century US machine-tool "industry (Rosenberg, 1972, pp. 100-101) . It has been argued that that industry split off at the top from machinery makers, because skills and techniques converged at this 'higher' level, as particular types of machine tools could readily be extended to a whole variety of machines. Thus the result was independence of the machine tools from machinery, and greater integration among the machine tools themselves. In similar fashion, building designers may be said to have split off from producers of buildings because skills converged at a 'higher' level. Exactly where the split occurred (and how permanently) is open to question.
The concept of division of labour, of course, is indissolubly linked with Adam Smith:
As it is the power of exchanging that gives occasion to the division of labour, so the extent of this division must always be limited by the extent of that power or, in other words, by the extent of the market. (Smith, 1976, p. 15) Thus, all else being equal, the division of labour and therefore the conditions favouring independence will be greatest where the extent of the market is greatest. ' Secondly, the extent of independence and concentration may also depend on the existence of economies or diseconomies of scale. Diseconomies of scale, favouring independence, may include difficulties with internal coordination and communication within the larger firm, advantages of stimulating creativity, effort and adventurousness, and the ability to keep in touch with local markets (Sayer and Walker, 1992, pp. 122-123) . Vertical disintegration may be associated with non-routine production, including project-based production, where specialization can reduce uncertainty and increase capacity utilization (Sayer and Walker, 1992, p. 216) .
Thirdly, and possibly overlapping with scale economies, are barriers to entry; again these affect both concentration in any one segment of the industry and vertical integration across segments. In Stigler's words: '[t]he forces which determine the size structure of industries are variously explained . .-. by barriers to entry, economies of scale and a host of particular instances of these (such as patents)' (Stigler, 1968, p. 65) . Other barriers to entry include substantial capital requirements, scarcity of essential skills or restrictions on availability of materials. Such entry barriers are usually 865 -thought of as being associated with low levels of independence, through limiting the number of participating firms; however, as will be shown below, certain types of barriers may increase independence. Fourthly, there may be links between managerial behaviour and independence. Satisficing behaviour may lead to inertia in the forms of industrial organization. Management may be unwilling to change previous routines, even in circumstances where profit maximization might warrant change. Whether such satisficing behaviour will favour independence or integration will depend upon whether the firm was previously independent or integrated; in other words it will be path-dependent. The perspective taken by some economic historians on the causes of British industrial retardation hinges on the slowness to adapt to new forms of organization, and for holding on for too long to a structure of independent small firms (Elbaum and Lazonick, 1986) . Different in kind from the above, though possible to regard as a particular type of entry barrier, is the factor of professionalization. A profession may be defined as 'an occupation possessing a skilled intellectual technique, a voluntary association and a code of conduct' (Kaye, I960, p. 17) . Professionals offer services that are 'esoteric, evanescent and fiduciary, in that clients do not know exactly what they want, or how to get it, and which must be taken on trust, and at a professional rather than market valuation' (Perkin, 1989, p. 117) . A function of professional associations is to provide an acceptable substitute for the market relationship and caveat emptor, by guaranteeing competence and integrity. Successful professions have their origins in clubs, members of which sought to distinguish competent practitioners and to exclude others. As levels of competence were raised, so professional concern extended to consideration of honour, and to ethical codes. But issues of respectability and status gradually transformed to protection of material interest (Carr-Saunders and Wilson, 1964, pp. 301-303) . From here it is a short step to Adam Smith's celebrated observation:
People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some diversion to raise prices. (Smith, 1976, p. 117) Professionals see themselves as 'above the main economic battle, at once privileged observers and benevolent neutrals' (Perkin, 1989, p. 117) . At the same time they are users of their own bargaining power as purveyors of useful knowledge, prepared to employ collective action as a central power resource and able to challenge elites (Rueschemeyer, 1986, pp. 106-107 
Construction and Designers
These theoretical considerations can now be placed in the context of the British construction industry and the position of building designers within it. The British construction industry, like those of other industrialized countries, is prominent in the parent national economy. Over 200 000 construction-related firms employed about 1.7 million people in Great Britain in the 1990s (Harvey and Ashworth, 1993, pp. 1-23, 102-116) . Although large, the industry is difficult to define precisely and has 'extraordinary complication' (Bowley, 1966, p. 439) in organizational structure: ill-defined edges and an ill-charted interior of firms, functions and relationships (Hillebrandt, 1984, pp. 1-3) . Although construction possesses an ancient industrial lineage, it retains to the present a fluid division of labour. How the numerous firms divide, form alliances and position themselves relative to one another remains open.
The context in which designers operate may be seen as a system consisting of numerous firms-of which a few are very large, some are medium sized and multitudes are small-embedded in a matrix of collaboration, contracts and ownership. Some firms enter into alliances with others, or engage with networks of them. Such alliances and networks may exist for the life of only one building project, or they may survive for many project cycles. Firms are either commercial businesses, professional practices or public authority departments; many are linked to similar concerns through trade associations or professional institutes. At the project level are coalitions and groups with conflicting interests. In this large, complicated and ever-changing industrial organization, division of labour may be regarded as arising from power, unevenly distributed among interest groups, as much as from the pursuit of efficiency. The power basis of individual firms is related to the resources possessed, their importance and scarcity.
Firms on the production side of the industry include large contractors (producing to order for known demand) and speculative builders (producing in advance of demand), wno take on overall management and financial responsibility for major projects. Medium and small firms undertake appropriately smaller projects down to the size of minor domestic repairs. Contractors are backed by numerous subcontractors for a great range of work, 867 based on trades (e.g. electrical engineering or concreting) rather than types of buildings. Some of these firms supply labour only or goods only, while others supply both. Extensive subcontracting is a well-established response to the high level of uncertainty of demand in construction, which exhibits the wide fluctuations characteristic of a capital goods industry producing long-lived products. Company formation is common, although there are many partnerships and sole principal firms in a long 'tail' of small firms. Some economies of scale exist although, given the great quantity of resources employed, they are not large (Harvey and Ashworth, 1993, pp. 102-116) .
Designers of buildings comprise a number of categories. The most prominent are architects, but also included in design decision-making is a variety of structural and services engineers, quantity and building surveyors, landscape, interior design and other specialists. Each profession has an institute, leading examples of which are large and well established (Harvey and Ashworth, 1993, pp. 172-90) . Large and complicated projects typically require large numbers of specialist design skills, some fleetingly, others for prolonged inputs. The contributions of the various professionals to a given project may take the form of independent consultant advice to the building promoter, or a commercial service rendered to another firm, e.g. the main contractor, engaged on the project. The pattern varies widely.
Architecture is a closed profession in the sense that the title is protected and entry is restricted (Kaye, I960, . Members of the profession share with other professions a propensity to develop and share their own meanings, understandings, norms, values and beliefs, which become some of the defining characteristics of the profession (Carr-Saunders and Wilson, 1964) . Anecdotal evidence suggests that architects' culture differs from that of firms engaged directly in the production of buildings, with attitudes that are more gentrified and less openly competitive.
The architects' culture is strongest among architects in private practice. The number of such UK practices in 1988 was 5298, of which 42.8% were 1-2 person size (excluding administrative staff, etc.), 85.6% were 10 person or smaller size, and 1.5% were 51 person or more. Approaching 50 000 people were employed full time in architectural practices (RIBA, 1988) . Other architects, a minority, work in local and central government, industry, etc. Business units in private practice are typically owner rather than manager controlled. The majority of practices appear to be 'satisficers', with emphasis on job satisfaction derived from creative design work rather than unrestrained attempts to pursue profits. Economies of scale are not very strong, although only large practices can expect to carry out the largest projects. Very large practices may also survive workload fluctuations better than medium-sized 868
practices. Diseconomies of scale are widely, though anecdotally, recognized: creativity and job satisfaction are said often to suffer with size (Gutman, 1988, p. 2) , while overhead costs increase, pushing the costs of large practices working on small projects above the corresponding costs of small practices. Small practices operate in local and niche markets. Some limited diversification exists among medium and large practices, into such Gelds as urban planning and interior design.The position and performance of the architectural profession has generated controversy (Rougvie, 1987, p. 157) . In this short introduction, the possible shortcomings are emphasized, though there are many who draw different inferences. Critical views of the profession include observations about levels of practical understanding, and the 'widespread inertia in the designing professions' (Bowley, 1966, pp. 78, 279) . The artistic side of architectural skills has been seen by some as overly path-dependent and becoming obsolete in a scientific age (Jenkins, 1961, p. 236) . A recent study conducted by the architects' professional institute concluded that architects' performance in matters of time and cost were unsatisfactory (RIBA, 1992 (Wales, 1989; Coleman, 1985) . Saint has aptly summed up a number of views about the profession:
what is ... inevitable: a smaller architectural profession, in which imagination and artistic ability are more evenly balanced with technical and managerial experience, in which collaboration with other specialists takes on a more realistic, less high-handed meaning, and in which 'sound building' is valued above high art. (Saint, 1983, p. 166) From the foregoing, architects may be characterized as occupying a somewhat uneasy position within a wide range of functions and firms in construction. Uneasy, that is, in their relationship both with 'upstream' building promoters on the demand side, and with 'downstream' supply-side interests in the construction industry. In the light of the theoretical correlates of the division of labour noted above, the typical conditions of UK architect firms would appear to have been determined by the large market, the limitations on scale economies, the prevalence of satisficing behaviour and, certainly, professionalization. The impact of these conditions, however, has changed over time, and a more precise assessment can be made by looking back to the historical roots of the industry and profession. 869
Historical Perspective
The following section reviews long-term change in the industry and the position of architects with reference to the various theoretical conditions shown above to be associated with independence and integration. For reasons of brevity four separate historical periods, rather than a continuous historical narrative, have been selected for treatment. The method adopted for each of the four periods will be to open with an outline of demand for construction, followed by the general response of the industry to changing demand, and then the architects' response. The four periods are: pre-industrial, c. 1750-1800; early industrial, c. 1800-1850; later industrial, c. 1919-1939; and modern, c. 1973 to the present. The first, scene setting, period forms a base against which the impact of industrialization is contrasted in the second period. The third period shows the mature development of changes begun earlier, and the fourth leads to the present day.
Pre-industrial <: . 1750-1800
Aggregate demand for new construction was small and, outside London and a few other centres, dispersed and intermittent. As befitted an agrarian economy, much of the demand arose in rural areas, leading to spatial as well as temporal fragmentation of activity. Most buildings were simple and many projects were initiated by naive promoters; that is to say, investing for the first and only time in building. The industry was divided broadly into skilled trades such as masons, bricklayers and carpenters. Entrepreneurs recognizable today as contractors, willing to undertake building works in their entirety, were few. Instead, many promoters dealt with successions of individual tradesmen, each responsible for part of the building. This applied to higher and mid-quality works. Some of the remainder were undertaken by those with only part-time construction interests, dividing their time between, say, brickfield, cornfield and building site-in line with Adam Smith's examples of lack of division of labour. Building form and technology developed only slowly, with methods repeated from one generation to the next. The higher up the scale of building quality, from squatter hut to stately home, the more likely were projects to be part of national rather than local markets. In a loosely integrated industry, or rather aggregation of trades, roles were ill-defined, overlapping and interchangeable. A strong consciousness of the industry as an entity had not developed, though it was nearest to doing so among those working on high-quality projects. Allegiances were dominated by process (trade skills) 870 rather than by product (building type). In this the industry looked inward on itself more than outward towards customers' needs (Locock, 1992) . The position of the designers as possessors of a discrete skill is not readily recognizable. Opportunities to exercise design skills were few, and the skills themselves were scarcely distinguishable from the cognate activities of surveyors who measured works in order to price them, and of trade craftsmen who decided how buildings were to be built. Yet designing, at least at the highest levels, could not be said to be wholly integrated with production. As architecture was regarded as a legitimate gentlemanly pursuit, some larger houses were designed by their well-informed amateur promoters. At the highest level of building quality, design ideas were exchanged internationally; one of the few such exchanges in the construction field. In all, designers made only a quantitatively small contribution, and that was confined to prestigious projects.
Early Industrial c. 1800-1850
Aggregate demand for building was much stimulated by increased economic activity associated with industrialization and urbanization. The upward path of building demand was not a smooth one, with fierce cycles of boom and slump now driven more by the state of trade than, as formerly, by harvests (Powell 1980, pp. 9-10) .
Demand also diverged qualitatively from the pre-industrial pattern. Typical projects became larger and more complicated, and there were design innovations in specialized building types and technology. Division of labour in the whole economy exerted pressure on the construction industry to produce new and more specialized buildings for new and more specialized processes. Leading promoters of construction activity included entrepreneurs in emergent industry and commerce.
The responses of the industry to demand were far-reaching. Ways emerged by which promoters were better able to protect themselves from sharp practice and incompetence. Old measure and value procedures, in which buildings were erected, measured and paid for on cost-plus-profit basis, were superseded. In their place, and instead of separate contracts for each craft trade, came single comprehensive contracts awarded to a general contractor on the basis of a competitive tender. The contractor took overall responsibility for the works and appointed subcontractors as required. By mid-century and despite reservations among some architects, this system of contracting in gross prevailed widely, though not universally. Gains for promoters from the new system, which integrated hitherto-fragmented responsibilities on site, 871
were the economic benefits of competition, knowledge of financial commitment before work began, and a single contractual relationship offering better control and coordination (Cooney, 1955 (Cooney, , 1980 . Roles in the industry gained definition, with the responsibilities of different interest groups more clearly differentiated. Such division of labour occurred at a time of sweeping expansion of productive capacity and increase in numbers of big firms. Growth of regional and national markets for materials and components was helped by an improving transport system for their distribution. Consciousness of the industry as an entity developed, as evidenced by the pioneering national periodical The Builder, from 1843. Older small-scale and parochial concerns increasingly found themselves pitted against larger, integrated and more technologically oriented rivals. Uncertainty and turbulence arose as individuals and firms struggled to adjust to changes in demand and in industrial organization. Gradually there began to emerge new patterns and hierarchies among, and within, the various interest groups making up the industry.
Designers acquired a clearer sense of self-identity and increasingly espoused ' professional values. They began to look more to their clients outside the industry, on the demand side, than to the supply side with which they shared technical knowledge and skills. From the 1820s leading practitioners gradually divorced themselves from direct involvement in production, seeking instead to represent promoters' interests and retain design responsibility. A professional ethos developed which had more in common with the gentry values to which designers aspired, than with the commercial values found on the production side. Designers' quests for superior status, and rejection of the values of production, fitted a society increasingly stratified by social class. Opportunities for designers opened in various directions: generally increased demand for buildings was one, another was demand for design innovations (unable to be met by builders unassisted), a third was the need to respond to official building controls. Designers were thus in a strong position among rival interest groups and were able to develop their role with some success. Distanced from the production side, they were better placed to attempt to monopolize relations with building promoters, and to claim to represent promoters' interests against the commercial interests of the production side. The distance travelled along this professional route by leaders of the professions was considerable, but many conservative practitioners still retained older links with production interests.
The period was characterized overall by a demand-side revolution, propelled by an industrializing economy, which called into being a counterpart supply-side revolution. A greatly expanded market for new buildings and new forms of buildings created a classic instance of Adam Smith's observation that 872 division of labour is intensified by growth of the market. Division of labour advanced: specialisms multiplied and became more sharply defined. Two of the interest groups best placed to assume positions of ascendancy among shifting and churning industrial organization were architects and general contractors. In addition to market growth, other factors also coincided to favour designers' independence: naive promoters, official building controls and the advance of professionalism in society generally.
Later Industrial c. 1919-1939
Demand for construction fluctuated, with recovery from the First World War slipping into depression, followed by later recovery curtailed in 1939 (Richardson and Aldcroft, 1968). Technical innovations became quite numerous (by the standards of an innately conservative industry), and official building controls were extended. Building promoters became bigger and more were organizations rather than individuals. With size came experience in their role, and hence they became better informed about building procedures. Public sector demand increased, and speculative work extended further, from housing into other segments.
Increased capacity was achieved through proliferation of firms and some use of new technology. Materials markets became broader and less local, while specialization among firms was carried forward by market growth together with technical innovations. Variety of contract procedures diminished, and became more formalized. In parts of the industry there appeared to grow a sense of tradition and, arguably, complacency (Bowley, 1966, p. 78 ). An industrial structure which included numerous small firms persisted, encouraged in part by workload fluctuations, but now as much divided by specialized function as by geographical isolation from one another. Ownership of a greater number of larger firms changed to jointly owned, limited liability companies, although very many firms retained single principal or small partnership formation.
Designers' response included closure of the architectural profession to the non-qualified, after a prolonged debate stretching back into the nineteenth century. Registration Acts of 1931 and 1938 protected the title from use by the unregistered. Architects' connections with building firms became strictly controlled, old combinations of architect-builder and architect-surveyor faded, and the consolidation of gentry status proceeded (Cooney 1987) . Most architects' practices were organized into independent private concerns owned by sole principals or partnerships, but there were
• 873 also a growing number of public authority architects' departments. Size and complexity of projects increased, lifting the importance of other design specialists and consultants, such as quantity surveyors and structural, mechanical and electrical engineers. Where architects gained influence from their closer proximity to promoters, they lost it in growing remoteness from other construction interest groups. Division of labour continued to advance with new specialisms emerging among a proliferating mass of interest groups. The enlarged overall size of the industry and diversity of firms within it served to encourage insularity among the various component parts. This lack of integration among interest groups, coupled with greater sense of identity within them, contrasted oddly with the growing technical integration of the products of the industry: more complicated and integrated buildings made by an industry composed of numerous discrete entities of firms. The period arguably witnessed the peaking of professionalism among architects, assisted by their orientation towards promoters and away from production interests. With professionalism came a peaking of independence. Yet forces were already gathering to influence events in a different direction: the advent of promoters with deeper experience and hence less amenable to subjection to professional experts. Just as architects' values and culture were moving towards their full development, conditions less favourable to independence were forming. Moderns 1973 Moderns -1994 Fluctuations of demand returned, with peaks early and late in the period. Demand for ever larger and more technically complicated buildings was notable. Public sector promoters, strong since the Second World War, declined. Private sector promoters, many seeking speculative rather than custom-built buildings, brought their own concerns of urgency and risk minimization to bear. Typical promoters became ever more experienced in dealing with the industry and more critical of its performance, particularly in respect of its ability to deliver work on time, and the adversarial attitudes common in the industry. Unfavourable comparisons were drawn with other industries and with construction overseas, particularly the USA (Ball, 1988, pp. 7-18; Barrett, 1993, pp. xii-xvi, 115) .
Responses of the industry included further expansion towards the diversity of specialist firms such as project managers. Contracting firms increasingly divested themselves of their craft labour forces, engaging subcontract labour instead. As building technology advanced, so did the capability of specialist 874
subcontractors to design as well as manufacture new products. This development had the effect of shifting some responsibility from independent designers to the production side. Another response was to experiment with novel, often US-inspired, procurement procedures intended to deliver work more quickly and reliably. Among these procedures were management contracting, construction management and design and build (Rougvie, 1987, pp. 140-154) . Innovatory procurement methods, coupled late in the period with slackening workload, appeared to sharpen competition among interest groups. Established and well-defined roles became more fluid and boundaries between responsibilities became more blurred. The sense of fragmentation into separate interest groups in the industry that had been observed earlier (Bowley, 1966, p. 439) persisted, and communications within the industry continued to be seen as a key to better performance. Business ethics and values of professional design consultants converged somewhat with those of more purely commercial firms engaged in production (Barrett, 1993, pp. xv-xvi, 115) . Pressures for integrating design with production, arising from introduction of information technology (e.g. computer-aided design/ manufacturing systems) appeared to remain in the future rather than being felt immediately (Ahmad et ai, 1995) .
The traditional position of architects as lead consultant, the first point of contact by intending promoters, was increasingly eroded by project managers, quantity surveyors, contractors and others (RIBA, 1992) . In Allinson's words, 'Architects have failed to positively deal with project management issues, and have been left behind as the project management concept achieved both greater urgency in clients' minds and wider recognition within the construction industry in general" (Allinson, 1993, p. 110) . Possible causes of this shift were various: already noted above were levels of practical understanding, indifference to time and cost, and popular dislike of many architects' products. To this list may be added the possible desire of contractors to assert greater control over projects; promoters' wishes for an easily managed single point of contact with the industry rather than a profusion of firms (Centre for Strategic Studies in Construction, 1988, pp. 38-71); growing competence and technical specialization of building component manufacturers and suppliers (Gray et al., 1994, pp. 21, 38) ; and the decline of public-sector promoters among whom architects had formerly been influential (Latham, 1994, p. 7) .
Practices expanded and regrouped in the expansionary phase of the economic cycle, many took on limited liability and a few of the largest became public companies. Subsequent recession and capacity reduction among larger concerns resulted in many newly redundant ex-employees setting up their 875 own small practices. Restraint on commercial activities imposed by the architects' professional code of conduct was relaxed from 1984, and fee competition between practices became overt with government-inspired abandonment of the fixed professional fee scale. By the close of the period, architects' independence appeared to be in decline. Some practices ceased to operate and others were acquired by non-architectural firms, either to be retained as going concerns or for full integration into the new parent. Both outcomes involved at least some loss of autonomy, as with the example of acquisition of public-sector architects' departments by private engineering design firms {Building Design, no. 1199 , 18 November 1994 . Some architects' firms experienced competition from non-architectural firms, as when builders' own designers assumed responsibility for detailed design of projects, and when project management consultants took over the management role that architects had traditionally fulfilled. The rate of change affecting architects' (and others') roles and responsibilities appeared to relate to stages in the economic cycle, with recession bringing about change that remained partly concealed until revealed in the succeeding upturn in the cycle.
Motives for taking on architects' former responsibilities remain only a subject for speculation, though a fitting one for a short digression. One motive may have been pecuniary gain, as when a practice was seen as a source of continuing fee income. A perhaps more likely motive may have been to gain access to, or greater control of, markets. Here the acquisition of a practice was likely to gain vertical integration for the acquiring firm. Another motive may have been to exert more control over designers, to reduce risk to the core activity of the acquiring firm. A further motive may have been to remove competition as, perhaps, between parts of the surveying profession and architects. One further possible motive was to acquire prestige and influence through contact with fashionable designers working on prestige projects.
Over the period there was a demand-side revolution based on promoters' needs for quicker and more reliable responses to changing market conditions, and the decline of public-sector promoters. This had an impact on the supply side, with dissatisfaction over performance, consequent stress and a search for remedies. Analysis of the problems of the industry overall shifted from a 'communications' model to one of'conflict'. In all, conditions favouring the independence of architects appeared to be waning, while some conditions favouring integration were growing. Among them were growth of experienced corporate promoters, a shift from professional ethics to business ethics, more fluid approaches to procurement, and growing design expertise by manufacturers rather than independent designers. 876
Historical Perspective and Theoretical Considerations
The four historical studies have yielded extensive empirically derived data. This will now be related in summary form to the theoretical conditions favouring independence or integration of designers considered earlier in the paper. Each historical period will be taken in turn. During the pre-industrial period (r. 1750-1800), demand was small, fragmented and intermittent, and on the supply side division of labour in the industry had scarcely proceeded far enough for designers to have emerged as a recognizable group. As predicted both by Adam Smith and the above discussion, the small market concurred with an integrated industry.
Over the early industrial period (c. 1800-1850), independence of designers increased as they emerged as a recognizable group from among a loosely differentiated mass of skills and trades making up the industry. Two factors predicted to favour independence are apparent. On the demand side was the growing extent of the market: construction activity, and with it design activity, increased greatly in respect of both total volume and numbers of projects, many of considerable size and some of innovative form and technology. The other factor, lying on the supply side, was that of professionalization. A sense of designers' professional identity emerged and found an institutional expression, although the process was incomplete at the close of the period.
In the late industrial period (c. 1919-1939), independence of designers increased, arguably to reach a peak, and the profession became more clearly defined than hitherto. The most visible determinant on the demand side . favouring independence remained as the upward secular trend of the extent of the market, though fluctuations also played a role. On the supply side the factor of continued professionalization was also taken further: the profession was closed to the non-qualified and the title became protected by law. A further tendency on the supply side favouring independence may have been satisficing behaviour on the part of an increasingly established and secure (sometimes complacent) profession.
During the modern period (c. 1973-1994), the growth of designers' independence, which had been going on for more than a century and a half, slowed and began to reverse. One variable on the demand side, that of market growth, continued to apply (though with fluctuations) and would seem to have been favouring independence. Building activity increased, certainly in total, and probably in the size of the largest projects. At the same time, three factors on the supply side seemed to be favouring integration: (i) a decline in professionalization (visible throughout British society, and not confined to architects); (ii) the emergence of some limited economies of scale in enlarged 877
designers' practices; and (iii) a shift towards more overtly profit-maximizing behaviour. Neither of the latter two, however, seemed to proceed very far, and were partly offset elsewhere. The main explanation for waning independence seems to lie with the reversal of professionalization.
Waning of Independence
The independence of architects' firms thus now appears to be waning. Some design tasks are becoming integrated elsewhere in the industry, e.g. responsibility for overall project management passes to contractors or professional specialists, and detailed design passes to contractors or manufacturers and suppliers. It was shown in the previous section that the main influence on declining independence was probably the decline in professionalization, which managed to swamp demand-side factors that in isolation would probably have fostered independence. It has been seen how building promoters became more experienced, concerned with urgency and risk, and wanting larger and more complicated buildings. The response of the architectural profession to some of these fundamental changes was muted. Given the magnitude of demand-side changes, why was this so?
As already mentioned, architects in Britain possess a distinctive culture of customs, achievements and beliefs. It is a culture distinguished to lesser or greater degree from those of corporate promoters (RIBA, 1992, vol. 2, p. 12) and of producers of buildings (RIBA, 1992, vol. 1, p. 49) . The distinguishing characteristics of the culture remain a largely unexplored area, although it would appear that the most significant characteristic, in this context, is an inturned, hermetic quality. Members of the profession appear to attach relatively more weight to views current among themselves than to views prevailing in the wider world outside: they appear more sensitive to stimuli arising within their own group than to those impinging from without. Buchanan's words, used of engineering professions, are also appropriate to the architectural profession: 'a withdrawal into congenial company within a largely hostile environment' (Buchanan, 1985, p. 43) . Reinforcing this generally has been a 'rising tide of popular displeasure at the pretensions and privileges of individual professions' (Perkin, 1989, pp. 472-476) .
Why should architects' culture have developed in this way in Britain? A speculative explanation is that isolation is in some sense a necessary condition for effective creativity. Isolated from opposing views, architects are unchallenged as they construct myths which help in the difficult and emotionally charged act of creativity. However, it is not clear why British 878 architects should need this more than, say, their American counterparts. Gutman (1988, p. 33 ) noted that to acknowledge reality would be to shatter several myths concerning the power, freedom and autonomy of the profession. Hence architects help sustain what they see as their onerous creative role by recourse to an anachronistic conception of social roles, perhaps including the preservation of gentry values as well as commitment to the virtues of visual elegance, sensitivity and conspicuous consumption. Such values are likely to be remote from the experience of most project promoters and those engaged in building production. Architects' culture, nurtured by a closed profession, may be suspected of influencing their position among other construction groups in various ways. One may be the architects' perception of their practical role, which they see in terms of the logic inherent in the problems and circumstances addressed (Rueschemeyer, 1986, p. 107) . Thus in regard to the division of labour they seem to focus on the design as the end-product, rather than the finished building which the other groups might emphasize. Moreover, their relations with building promoters are likely to be affected by their commonly looking with favour upon designing so as to satisfy individual needs of building users. Users with known preferences and idiosyncrasies are encouraged, as individuality and character is then thought to be imparted to the building. Promoters are more likely instead to represent generalized and anonymous corporate interests, regarding buildings as instrumental in the pursuit of profit and efficiency goals (Cuff, 1991, p. 56 ). Yet another cultural aspect which might be particularly relevant in illuminating the muted response of architects to changing demand could be an individualistic orientation, perhaps characteristic of the creative temperament. This would again help make for a fissile rather than cohesive collective viewpoint.
Architects are not narrowly confined by their cultural preferences to the satisfaction of individual rather than corporate wants. Historically, architects have proclaimed from time to time their concern for broad issues in society at large, beyond the sectional interests of individual promoters. In Gropius's words, 'the greatest responsibility of the . . . architect ... is the protection and development of our habitat' (Gropius, 1956, p. 169) . Stress could arise where there is conflict in an emerging design between the assumed general needs of society and promoters' specific wants, and this could undermine their views of each other.
To sum up, architects encapsulated in a creative culture may appear indifferent to downstream production interest groups. Such groups may respond with a search for closer control over architects; perhaps, for example, in order to minimize risk. Architects may also appear out of sympathy with 879 upstream promoters. In consequence the latter may seek alternative first points of contact with the industry. The overall effect is to discourage architects' independence, and to encourage their integration with other construction interest groups. The inturned nature of architects' culture appears to have been fostered by professionalization. In the case of architects, closure of the profession arguably gave opportunities for the development of a culture conducive to exacting creative work, a feature of which was limited exchange with the world beyond the profession. What may have been beneficial for fostering creativity may well also have inhibited an appropriately far-reaching response to great shifts in demand for architects' services.
Conclusion
The exogenous factor of the extent of the market, by encouraging division of labour in the manner originally emphasized by Adam Smith, stimulated the independence of architects for most of the period since the early industrial revolution. Lack of substantial scale economies in most of their work, and a proclivity not to change (inertial behaviour) reinforced this pattern. The endogenous factor of growing professionalization had a similar effect at first. Eventually, however, a disjuncture arose between demand-side expectations and supply-side responses that was sufficient to overcome the impact of the growth of the market alone on independence. Independence increasingly gave way to integration of other interest groups concerned with construction; prominent among these were the builders and the shift towards project-based work under their leadership, together with the greater role of other white-collar groups.
The rising tension between demand and supply characteristics poses a dilemma for the profession, and also for society at large. On the one hand, the onerous creative task of designing appears to require a culture somewhat detached from society. To the extent that the creativity is successful (an outcome that is not only subjective but much debated in practice), society may then benefit from the creations. On the other hand, such a culture can act as an obstacle to changes in demand. The influence of the profession may then diminish, and society for its part may express its dissatisfaction with the results.
More broadly, the economy at large may suffer from the division of labour along such lines. The negative effects of architectural professionalization on British retardation are likely to have been small, because of the comparatively small size of the occupation; but similar patterns and associated tensions 880 appear to have evolved in other key professions, such as engineering (and perhaps university professors). Comparisons with such other professions, and with other countries, may prove rewarding in this under-researched area. Finally, this paper demonstrates that the division of labour is influenced not only by efficiency considerations, in the manner suggested by Adam Smith, but also by institutional structures and dynamics. Indeed, the recent British experience shows that the effects deriving from the widening of the market may be outweighed by such institutional changes, to reverse the tendency towards independence and foster integration.
